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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of ·the 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTA.H, 





AP·PEAL. FROM SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
·COURT OF WEBER COUNTY,· 
THE HONORABLE PARLEY E. NORSETH, 
DISTRICT JUDGE 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
.This/ ~s. a prosecution for driving a mptor. vehicle 
... . . . . . . . ~ . 
while under the influence of intoxicating liquor~ The 
District Court, upon motion of Respondent directed a 
verdict of .. acquittal. The State seeks to have- th-e order 
di~e~t~g ~~e- verdict ~eversed upon appeal. 
Respondent wishes to set forth facts adduced upon 
trial· of· this case in. ·greater detail thanl appellant has 
done. 
-Defendant was -proceeding easterly upon twelfth 
street, in Ogden, just emerging from a sha.rp "S" turn. 
(Tr. 23, 30, photograph). This road is asphalt, 23' 2" 
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wide with no curb. The asphalt ends and a gravel or 
dirt shoulder 20 feet wide begins with no line of de-
marcation or drop off. (Tr. 23) The road has no divid-
ing stripe. (Tr. 37} The point of impact was upon the 
paved portion of tbe road, not the shoulder, (Tr. 32). 
The accident occurred about 7 :15 P.M. on March '26,. 
1960. It was dusk, or dark, the defendant's headlights 
were on, the street lights . were not lighted, th~ girPs 
bicy-cle had no light, and an oncoming car may or may 
not have had its lights on. (Tr. 28, 22, 24, 16, 26). The 
girl was riding on-the left hand side of the road (Tr. 11). 
There was no evidence of excessive speed. Defendant's 
car was · partially off the hard surface, but otherwise 
appeared, to be operating normally. (Tr. 20). Just 
prior to impact, the car began to slide as if the brakes 
had been applied suddenly (Tr. 21, 23}. Further facts 
will be referred to in the argument. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE STATE DID NOT PRESENT EVIDENCE 
SUFFICIENT T·O GO TO THE JURY ON THE 
ISSUES OF NEGLIGENCE AND PROXIMATE 
CAUSE. 
Res~ondent, in moving for dismissal, argued three 
grounds: (Tr. 63-64). 
(a) 41~6-44,, U.C.A. 1953, is violative of Article 6, 
Sec~ion 23, and Article 1, Section 24, of the Constitution 
of the State of Utah. 
(b) . Criminal negligence, as opposed to siniple neg-
ligence, is required to convict under 41-6-44, U.C.A., 
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1953, when the State charged an indictable misde-
meanor, and this burden was not met. 
(c) The State did not make a sufficient showing to 
go to the jury on the issue of even simple negligence 
and proximate cause. 
The trial court granted respondent's motion, and 
the State has taken this app~al. Argument . (a) will 
be reviewed under point II. Argument (b) has been 
disposed of by the recent decision of this court in State 
vs. Johnson, 364 Pac. 2d 1019, and will not be argued 
in this appeal. It should be noted that the Johnson 
decisio-n was made September 13, 1961, the very day 
this case was determined, and the trial court and counsel 
did not have it available when this case was decided. 
Our major argument concerns the lack of evidence 
of .even simple negligence. No violation of statute or 
ordinance was claimed or shown; the State ( App. Brief 
page 6 and Tr. 4-5) rests its proof on the civil doct~rines 
of "failure to keep safe and proper control of a motor 
vehicle" and "failure to keep a safe a proper lookout." 
As to control, the State made no claim for and 
offered no evidence to show excessive speed. The eye 
witnesses agreed the car was not entirely upon the 
hard-top, but was partially upon the dirt or gravel side. 
This is not negligence, as we will argue infra. The 
witness Janet Sandberg, age 13, was upon a bicycle 
across the road, although her position varied in her 
testimony from being at the curve itself (Tr. 14) to 
being even with the rear of defendant's car (Tr. 13). 
The trial court could see and observe the conduct and 
demeanor of all the witnesses, and its interpretation of 
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the evidence should be given considerable weight. The 
other witness to the accident, James Abbott, age 19, 
testified he watched the car come around the curve and 
it was partially on the hard top and partially off. Other 
than this it seemed to be operated in a normal manner 
(Tr. 20). Just prior to impact, the car started to slide 
much as if the brakes had been suddenly applied. (Tr. 
23-24). K:aylene Smart, the injured girl, age 12, was 
present at the trial but did not testify. 
The evidence relied upon to show a failure to keep 
a proper lookout seems to be simply that defendant 
did not stop in time to avoid the accident, from which 
it can be argued that if he had kept a proper lookout, 
he could have stopped. In its brief, appellant asserts 
that defendant's car struck Kaylene Smart before the 
brakes were applied. (Page 6). The evidence did not 
show this-only that "identifiable" skid marks began 
at the point of impact. There were other brake marks 
on the ground, but the witness could not positively tie 
them into the defendant's car (Tr. 39). Abbott's testi-
mony indicated the brakes "\Yere applied prior thereto 
(Tr. 23). At the very minilnum, the brakes would 
have been applied a sufficient distance away to allow 
for the reaction tune of the defendant, since the identi-
fiable skid marks began at the point of impact, not 
after. 
l{aylene Smart "\Yas riding an unlighted bicycle 
(Tr. 16) in violation of 41-6-90, U.C.A., 1953, 'vhich pro-
vides: 
"Every bicycle operated during the nighttime 
shall be equipped "\vith a la1np on the front ex.:. 
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hibiting a white light visible from a distance of 
at least 500 feet to the front and with a red re-
flector on the .rear of a type approved by the 
state road commission which shall be visible 
from fifty to 300 feet to the rear when directly 
in front of lawful upper beams of head lamps on 
motor vehicles. A red light visible from a ·dis-
tance of 500 feet to the rear may be used in ad-
dition to the red reflector." 
She was riding on the left hand side of the road, in 
violation of 41-6-87, (a) and (c) U.C.A., 1953 which 
read as follows : 
"(a) Every person operating a bicycle upon a 
roadway shall ride as near to the right side of 
the roadway as practicable, exercising due care 
when passing ·a standing vehicle or one proceed-
ing the same direction. 
(c) Whenever a usable path for bicycles has 
been provided adjacent to a roadway bicycle 
riders shall use such path and shall not use the 
roadway." 
Contributory negligence is not a defense to this action, 
but certainly is entitled to be considered in determining 
proximate cause and the question of whether defend-
ant was negligent. Kaylene was riding an unlighted 
bicycle on the wrong side of the roadway, and there 
were no street lights operative. The lights of the 
Abbott car may have been on, shining into defendant's 
eyes as he came out of the turn. No evidence was 
offered as to the color of Kaylene's bicycle, or of her 
clothing on the night in question. Kaylene was "dodg-
.5 
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ing" rocks being thrown at her by neighborhood boys, 
one of the rocks struck her bicycle just prior to the 
accident, and she was looking back to see where the 
rocks were coming so she could dodge them (Tr. 11, 
15 & 16). Both Abbott and Sandberg testified she was 
riding on the shoulder, but neither witness watched her 
as the car approached and the accident occurred on the 
hard top. When questioned by police, defendant said 
she had "darted" in front of him. (Tr. 56). 
It is not negligence to drive a car partially off the 
hard surfaced portion of the road, 60 C.J.S. 1\Iotor 
Vehicles, Sec. 276. No Utah statute concerns it. The 
Virginia Supreme Court in Boggs v. Plybon, 160 S.E. 77, 
espoused this principle and said: 
"We have seen that this defendant, on a dark 
night, drove his car along the outside edge of 
a slightly curved road and on its right-hand side, 
measured by the direction in \vhich he \vas going. 
Had he failed to keep to the right and had a col-
lision followed, he might have been held liable. 
He did keep to the right and, by chance, a trifle 
too far to the right, so the his right wheel ran 
from the hard surface into the soft shoulder. If 
there was negligence at all, this \vas it. It is not 
claimed that he failed in any duty afterwards. 
It is not per se negligence for the outside \Vheel 
of any auto1nobile, traveling at a reasonable rate, 
to run off the macada1n. Indeed, it i-s an everyday 
occ nrrence. If plaintiff is to prevail, \ve must 
hold that such an incident is in itself negligence, 
and this we cannot do no matter what standards 
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we n1ight adopt measuring the duty to a guest." 
(Italics added) . 
The Utah cases of Davidson v. Utah Independent 
Telephone Co., 34 Ut. 249, 97 Pac. 124, and Christensen 
v. Utah Rapid Transit Co., 83 Ut. 231, 27 Pac. 2nd 468, 
have approved this rule. In the Davidson case this 
court said: 
"But counsel for appellant contended, if we cor-
rectly understand their position, that the word 
"street" in this kind. of a case should be restricted 
to mean only that portion of the highway laying 
between the sidewalk ·areas on either side, and 
where, as in this case, no part of the street has 
been laid off, set apart, or used as a sidewalk, 
an imaginary line should be drawn between that 
part of the street which would constitute a side-
walk if one were established and the balance of 
the highway,, and, if it were shown that the acci-
dent causing the injury complained of happened 
within the sidewalk area so established, a re-
covery could not be h~d, and that the court should 
have so instructed the jury. The rule, as we under-
stand it, is that where, as in this case, the full 
width of the street is open for travel, and there 
are no excavations, trenches, embankments, or 
visible objects of any kind to indicate that a 
porti.on of the street has been set aside or used 
as a sidewalk, a party traveling along such high-
way may use any part of it as may suit his con-
venience or taste, and he is entitled to protection 
against the unlawful acts of other persons or 
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corporations." (Italics added) 
In any event, such action could not be a proximate 
cause of injury because the impact took place upon the 
pavement. 
Skidding or sliding is not evidence of negligence 
or lack of control. 5A Am. Jtir. Automobiles, Sec. ~41; 
Rodriguez v. Abadie, 168 So. 515, wherein the Supreme 
Court of Louisiana said : 
"It is a matter of common knowledge that an 
automobile will skid when brakes are suddenly 
applied in an emergency. The fact that defend-
ant's car skidded in this case is, we think, mute 
evidence of an attempt on the part of defendant's 
daughter to perform all acts possible to avoid 
the accident, when faced 'vith an emergency." 
Defendant's duty to keep a lookout is not absolute, 
but only reasonable. Morrison vs. Perry, 104 Ut. 151, 
140 Pac. 2nd 772. Defendant was not required to antici-
pate he would be faced with an emergency, and could 
presume that the laws of the road would be observed 
by others.. No evidence "~as introduced by the State 
to show defendant should have anticipated a bicycle on 
the road or any other emergency. The case of Richards 
v. Palace La~tndry 55 U t. 409, 186 Pac. 439, is of sig-
nificance here. In that case a motorist sa"' a bicyclist 
approaching on the proper side of the road, did not 
continue to 'vatch hiin, and ''Then the bicycle suddenly 
appeared in front of his car was unable to avoid a 
collision. In affir1ning a non suit at the close of plain-~ 
tiff's case, this court said: 
8 
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. ; 
"While in case the street or highway is not used 
by others one may drive on any part thereof, 
. yet, when a traveler passes from the right to 
the. left of the center of the street he, to say the 
least, loses some of his rights, and may not be 
heard to complain of the conduct of those who 
are on the :proper side of the street to the same 
extent as though he also were on the proper side. 
In Presser v. Dougherty, 239· Pa. 312, 86 Atl. 
854, the decision is correctly reflected in the head-
note, where the law is stated thus: 
"The mere fact that plaintiff collided with the 
automobile does not raise any presumption of 
neglige:q.ce, especially where the plaintiff was 
riding on··the wrong side of the street, and there 
was no· evidence that the automobile was being 
operated at a. dangerous rate of speed. 
In Babbitt, Motor Vehicles, section 356, it 
·is said: 
"A driver on the right~hand side of the road has 
~:right to assume that vehicles coming in the 
opposi~e. direction will not violate the law of the 
·:road." 
. That is, that they will continue in the di-
rection they are coming on the proper side of 
the road or street. 
In Ballard v. Collins, supra, the rule is 
tersely stated in the following words: 
-G; "A person using a street as a highway has 
the right to presume that the law of the road 
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will · be observed." 
The Presser v. Dougherty case quoted with ap-
proval is very close to the instant case, except that it 
occurred in broad daylight. In that case, a bicyclist 
pedaling down the wrong side of the road was struck 
by an oncoming car that had just turned into the street. 
The Pennsylvania Supreme court held that as a matter 
of law no negligence was shown on the car driver, and 
affirmed a non suit at the close of plaintiff's case. 
The fact an accident happened is no evidence of 
negligence, 5A Am. Jur. Automobiles Sec. 923. Appel-
lant, in the direct examination of a State witness, in-
troduced defendant's statement that the girl on the bicy-
cle had "darted" in front of him. The State is bound 
by its evidence of his explanation, unless it offer sub-
stantial evidence to show that the- statement made by 
the defendant is not true. 23 C.J.S. Criminal Law 
Sec. 909, page 583. Here the State has not produced 
evidence to dispute this statement, but all the evidence 
substantiates it. The evidence shows that Kaylene 
Smart, in the dark on an unlighted bicycle, sudden!~ 
"dodged" or "darted" in front of defendant's car; that 
defendant slammed on his brakes, skidding, in an effort 
to avoid the collision, but was unable to do so. 
Although "negligence" as here used is a civil term, 
it must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt as an ele-
ment of the crime charged. State vs. Hendricks, 123 
Ut. 267, 258 Pac. 2nd 452. Unless the proof is such as 
to preclude every reasonable hypothesis except that 
which it supports, and is 'vholly consistent with the de-
fendant's guilt and inconsistent with his innocence, it 
1() 
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will not be sufficient. 23 C.J.S. Criminal Law Sec. 910, 
State v. Gutheil, 98 Ut. 205, 98 Pac. 2nd 943, State v. 
1/ u rch, 100 U. 41--l, 115 Pac. 2nd 911. 
POINT II .. 
41-6-44, U.C.A. 1953, IS IN VIOLATION OF 
ARTICLE VI, . SECTION 23, OR ARTICLE I, SEC-
TION-· ·24; OF .THE UTAH· CONSTITUTION. 
Appellant took the position in its information 
(R-~2), upon the Trial (Tr. 4, 5, 67, 68) and upon this 
appeal (Appellants Brief, Page 5) that 41-6-44 pro-
scribes 2 crimes, one an indictable misdemeanor, the 
other a simple misdemeanor. This may not be so. The 
statute is similar in form, nearly identical, to 57-7-111 
(a), U.C.A. 1943. This court has held that section 
defined only one crime, driving under the influence, 
with two punishments, the greater one for second of-
fenders. State vs. Ste~vart, 110 Ut. 203, 171 Pac. 2d 383. 
Thus, the proper procedure under that Section was to 
try first the question of guilt or innocence of driving 
under the influence, and if convicted, then try the quest-
ion of the second conviction. It was reversible error to 
admit evidence of other convictions during trial of the 
offense. State vs. Stewart, supra. 
Therefo.re, if two crimes are now imposed, it is 
by virtue of the . 1957 amendment. The title of this 
Act is 
"DRIVING WHILE UNDER THE INFLU-
·. ENQ.E OF LIQUOR . 
. "An Act Amending Sections 41-6-43 and 61-6-44, 
11 
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Utah Code Annotated 1953 Relating to Driving 
a Motor Vehicle While Intoxicated or under the 
Influence of Narcotics; and Providing· for an In-
creased Penalty." 
The title does not refer to any new or additional 
crime, but refe.rs only to "increased punishment", ap-
parently for the same: crime. We submit that· if in 'fact 
there are two crimes; by virtue of the 1957 enactment, 
the new ~rime is not set forth clearly ~ the title of the 
Act, and in fact is ~ot set forth at all, in violation of 
Article yi, Section 23 of the Utah Constitution: 
"Except general appropriation bills, and bills 
for the codification and general revision of laws, 
· no bill shall be passed containing more than one 
subject, which shall be clearly· expressed in its 
title." 
We think the 1957 Legislature did not intend. to 
enact a new crime, but only to provide an additional 
penalty for negligent driving. This is because (1) prior 
to 1957 this c()urt had .construed 57-7-111 (a) as con-
taining one cr4ne, (2) the 1957 amendment did not 
change the first parag1;aph of the section, which. de-
fines the crime, (3) the 1957 .amendment lifted out the 
second offense provision and substituted the negligence 
provision, ( 4) the ·clear reading of the Act and Sec-
tion D thereof "* * * such defendant" indieates the 
added penalty is to be considered only after conviction. 
The conclusion is that the ·statute defines one of-
fense, the driving of a vehicle while under the influence 
of intoxicating liquor, but provides two punishments. 
12 
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This \YP submit 1s .violative of Act. I, Sec. 24, Utah 
Consitution: 
"All laws of a general nature shall have uniform 
operation." 
Disparate punishment may be nonviolative of this 
provision if it applies equally to all members of a class, 
and if the elassification is a reasonable one. This court 
has considered the reverse of this in State v .. Twitchell, 
8 Utah 2d 314, 333 Pac. 2d 1075. As we read that case, 
it holds that the negligent ho1nicide enactment is a 
reasonable classification, and a defendant may not com-
plain because his punishment (as a drunken driver) iR 
greater than it would have been had he been sober. We 
differentiate this case from Twitchell by (1) the Legis-
lature did not declare the negligent driving while in-
toxicated to be a crime, but merely attempted to add 
an additional penalty to .an existing offense, and (2) 
the classification here is unreasonable because it pro-
vides a highly increased penalty solely on the basis of 
doing a lazvful act. This defendant was not charged 
\vith, and it has never been contended that he violated 
any statute or ordinance other than intoxicated driving. 
Under this law, one driver who while intoxicated, vio-
lates speed laws, runs stop signs, etc., and only manages 
to destroy prope!ty or injure himself has committed 
a simple misdemeanor; the other intoxicated driver 
u·ho t·iolates no laws but injures a person is subject to 
the heavier offense. 
POINT III. 
THE ·TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REFUSED 
13 
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TO SUBMIT TO THE JURY THE QUE.STION OF 
DEFENDANT'S GUI;LT OR INNOCENCE. 
Appellant, in its information (R-22), at the- trial 
(Tr. 4, 5, 67, 68) and upon this appeal has taken the 
position that 4-16-44 contains two offenses. The ele-
ments ·of the crime charged, as asserted and -relied 
upon by appellant, are: 
"1. Operating a motor vehicle, 
2. While under the influence of intoxicating liquor, 
3. Negligence, 
4. Proximately causing or contributing to 
5. Injury to another person. 
As we have seen under Point I, elements 3 and 4 
were not proved; as set out in Point II, this act con-
tains one crime, not two. Therefore, at the close of 
the State's case, the court was faced with this: 
(1) The State had charged defendant with violation 
of 41-6-44, U. C.A. 1953. -
(2) The State had set forth in its information, 
opening statement, argument, proof and instructions 
five elements it was relying upon. 
(3) The State had failed in its proof on two ele-
ments. 
( 4) There was no included offense, because the 
statute defendant was charged under contained but one 
. 
crime. 
Under thes-e circumstances, the State having failed 
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to prove the elements it claimed essential to the offense, 
we submit the trial court was completely ·correct in 
granting the defendant's motion and .di;recti~g a verdict. 
CONCLUSION 
The Order of the District Court directing a v~rdict 
cf acquittal should be affirmed. ,, ·'· 
Respectfully submitted, 
HOWELL, STINE AND OLMSTEAD 
By Richard W. Campbell 
Attorneys for Defendant 
';r. 




Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
